Tuesday, May 22, 2012

HR 347-2, read and think

Here is HR 347-2 that is being suggested around that web that Obama is making free speech a felony.  Read the bill and make your own conclusion.

To me, it doesn't seem that much different then what is currently in place.

With three representatives voting no, the House passed the bill.  The Senate passed the law without a single no vote. 

For more opinons on the community, please visit The Responsible Community

HR 347-2

One Hundred Twelfth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the third day of January, two thousand and twelve

An Act

To correct and simplify the drafting of section 1752 (relating to restricted buildings

or grounds) of title 18, United States Code.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Federal Restricted Buildings

and Grounds Improvement Act of 2011’’.

SEC. 2. RESTRICTED BUILDING OR GROUNDS.

Section 1752 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to

read as follows:

‘‘§ 1752. Restricted building or grounds

‘‘(a) Whoever—

‘‘(1) knowingly enters or remains in any restricted building

or grounds without lawful authority to do so;

‘‘(2) knowingly, and with intent to impede or disrupt the

orderly conduct of Government business or official functions,

engages in disorderly or disruptive conduct in, or within such

proximity to, any restricted building or grounds when, or so

that, such conduct, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly

conduct of Government business or official functions;

‘‘(3) knowingly, and with the intent to impede or disrupt

the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions,

obstructs or impedes ingress or egress to or from any restricted

building or grounds; or

‘‘(4) knowingly engages in any act of physical violence

against any person or property in any restricted building or

grounds;

or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as provided

in subsection (b).

‘‘(b) The punishment for a violation of subsection (a) is—

‘‘(1) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more

than 10 years, or both, if—

‘‘(A) the person, during and in relation to the offense,

uses or carries a deadly or dangerous weapon or firearm;

or


‘‘(B) the offense results in significant bodily injury as

defined by section 2118(e)(3); and

‘‘(2) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more

than one year, or both, in any other case.

‘‘(c) In this section—

H. R. 347—2

‘‘(1) the term ‘restricted buildings or grounds’ means any

posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area—

‘‘(A) of the White House or its grounds, or the Vice

President’s official residence or its grounds;

‘‘(B) of a building or grounds where the President or

other person protected by the Secret Service is or will

be temporarily visiting; or

‘‘(C) of a building or grounds so restricted in conjunction

with an event designated as a special event of national

significance; and

‘‘(2) the term ‘other person protected by the Secret Service’

means any person whom the United States Secret Service is

authorized to protect under section 3056 of this title or by

Presidential memorandum, when such person has not declined

such protection.’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

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Sunday, May 6, 2012

The debates in the several state conventions on the adoption of the Federal Constitution, Volume 4. 

The link is to James Madison's responses to the Allein and Sedition act.

PADILLA v. KENTUCKY ( No. 08-651 )

PADILLA v. KENTUCKY ( No. 08-651 )
253 S. W. 3d 482, reversed and remanded.


Scalia, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JOSE PADILLA, PETITIONER v. KENTUCKY

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of kentucky

 [March 31, 2010]

Justice Scalia , with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.

In the best of all possible worlds, criminal defendants contemplating a guilty plea ought to be advised of all serious collateral consequences of conviction, and surely ought not to be misadvised. The Constitution, however, is not an all-purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world; and when we ignore its text in order to make it that, we often find ourselves swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a lawyer “for his defense” against a “criminal prosecutio[n]”—not for sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction. For that reason, and for the practical reasons set forth in Part I of J ustice A lito ’s concurrence, I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to provide accurate advice concerning the potential removal consequences of a guilty plea. For the same reasons, but unlike the concurrence, I do not believe that affirmative misadvice about those consequences renders an attorney’s assistance in defending against the prosecution constitutionally inadequate; or that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to warn immigrant defendants that a conviction may render them removable. Statutory provisions can remedy these concerns in a more targeted fashion, and without producing permanent, and legislatively irreparable, overkill.

The Sixth Amendment as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of counsel. See, United States v. Van Duzee , 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891) ; W. Beaney, Right to Counsel in American Courts 21, 28–29 (1955). We have held, however, that the Sixth Amendment requires the provision of counsel to indigent defendants at government expense, Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U. S. 335, 344–345 (1963) , and that the right to “the assistance of counsel” includes the right to effective assistance, Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668, 686 (1984) . Even assuming the validity of these holdings, I reject the significant further extension that the Court, and to a lesser extent the concurrence, would create. We have until today at least retained the Sixth Amendment ’s textual limitation to criminal prosecutions. “[W]e have held that ‘defence’ means defense at trial, not defense in relation to other objectives that may be important to the accused.” Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (A lito , J., concurring) (slip op., at 4) (summarizing cases). We have limited the Sixth Amendment to legal advice directly related to defense against prosecution of the charged offense—advice at trial, of course, but also advice at postindictment interrogations and lineups, Massiah v. United States , 377 U. S. 201, 205–206 (1964) ; United States v. Wade , 388 U. S. 218, 236–238 (1967) , and in general advice at all phases of the prosecution where the defendant would be at a disadvantage when pitted alone against the legally trained agents of the state, see Moran v. Burbine , 475 U. S. 412, 430 (1986) . Not only have we not required advice of counsel regarding consequences collateral to prosecution, we have not even required counsel appointed to defend against one prosecution to be present when the defendant is interrogated in connection with another possible prosecution arising from the same event. Texas v. Cobb , 532 U. S. 162, 164 (2001) .

There is no basis in text or in principle to extend the constitutionally required advice regarding guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to the criminal prosecution at hand—to wit, the sentence that the plea will produce, the higher sentence that conviction after trial might entail, and the chances of such a conviction. Such matters fall within “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” McMann v. Richardson , 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970) . See id., at 769–770 (describing the matters counsel and client must consider in connection with a contemplated guilty plea). We have never held, as the logic of the Court’s opinion assumes, that once counsel is appointed all professional responsibilities of counsel—even those extending beyond defense against the prosecution—become constitutional commands. Cf. Cobb , supra , at 171, n. 2; Moran , supra , at 430. Because the subject of the misadvice here was not the prosecution for which Jose Padilla was entitled to effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment has no application.

Adding to counsel’s duties an obligation to advise about a conviction’s collateral consequences has no logical stopping-point. As the concurrence observes,

“[A] criminal convictio[n] can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. . . . All of those consequences are ‘serious,’ … .” Ante , at 2–3 ( Alito, J., concurring in judgment).

But it seems to me that the concurrence suffers from the same defect. The same indeterminacy, the same inability to know what areas of advice are relevant, attaches to misadvice. And the concurrence’s suggestion that counsel must warn defendants of potential removal consequences, see ante , at 14–15—what would come to be known as the “ Padilla warning”—cannot be limited to those consequences except by judicial caprice. It is difficult to believe that the warning requirement would not be extended, for example, to the risk of heightened sentences in later federal prosecutions pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C. §924(e). We could expect years of elaboration upon these new issues in the lower courts, prompted by the defense bar’s devising of ever-expanding categories of plea-invalidating misadvice and failures to warn—not to mention innumerable evidentiary hearings to determine whether misadvice really occurred or whether the warning was really given.

The concurrence’s treatment of misadvice seems driven by concern about the voluntariness of Padilla’s guilty plea. See ante , at 12. But that concern properly relates to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment s, not to the Sixth Amendment . See McCarthy v. United States , 394 U. S. 459, 466 (1969) ; Brady v. United States , 397 U. S. 742, 748 (1970) . Padilla has not argued before us that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. If that is, however, the true substance of his claim (and if he has properly preserved it) the state court can address it on remand. 1 But we should not smuggle the claim into the Sixth Amendment .

The Court’s holding prevents legislation that could solve the problems addressed by today’s opinions in a more precise and targeted fashion. If the subject had not been constitutionalized, legislation could specify which categories of misadvice about matters ancillary to the prosecution invalidate plea agreements, what collateral consequences counsel must bring to a defendant’s attention, and what warnings must be given. 2 Moreover, legislation could provide consequences for the misadvice, nonadvice, or failure to warn, other than nullification of a criminal conviction after the witnesses and evidence needed for retrial have disappeared. Federal immigration law might provide, for example, that the near-automatic removal which follows from certain criminal convictions will not apply where the conviction rested upon a guilty plea induced by counsel’s misadvice regarding removal consequences. Or legislation might put the government to a choice in such circumstances: Either retry the defendant or forgo the removal. But all that has been precluded in favor of today’s sledge hammer.

In sum, the Sixth Amendment guarantees adequate assistance of counsel in defending against a pending criminal prosecution. We should limit both the constitutional obligation to provide advice and the consequences of bad advice to that well defined area.

Notes

1 I do not mean to suggest that the Due Process Clause would surely provide relief. We have indicated that awareness of “direct consequences” suffices for the validity of a guilty plea. See Brady, 397 U. S., at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the required colloquy between a federal district court and a defendant required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) (formerly Rule 11(c)), which we have said approximates the due process requirements for a valid plea, see Libretti v. United States, 516 U. S. 29, 49–50 (1995) , does not mention collateral consequences. Whatever the outcome, however, the effect of misadvice regarding such consequences upon the validity of a guilty plea should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause.
2 As the Court’s opinion notes, ante, at 16–17, n. 15, many States—including Kentucky—already require that criminal defendants be warned of potential removal consequences.

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Friday, February 10, 2012

Obama reverses course after pressure from allies

Feb 10 (Reuters) - As soon as the news hit, the deluge began.
Catholics from across the country began calling the White House within hours of the Obama administration's announcement on Jan. 20 that religious institutions would be required to offer free birth control to employees as a health-care benefit.
But these calls weren't protests from conservative bishops or the rank-and-file in the pews. They were calls from a kitchen cabinet of informal political advisers that President Barack Obama had relied on for years -- allies who had worked with him on various social issues and in some cases, campaigned for him.
They had access, and they intended to use it to drive change in a policy they said they saw as a clumsy, provocative and an unnecessary infringement on religious liberty.
Among the many who called: Tim Roemer, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana; Stephen Schneck, a political scientist at the Catholic University of America; and Sister Simone Campbell, who runs a Catholic social-justice lobby in Washington.
They reached out to friends in the Obama campaign, in the office of Vice President Joe Biden, in the White House domestic policy shop and its office of faith-based initiatives, in the Department of Health and Human Services.
One even wrote a proposed speech for the president, in which Obama would admit he'd been wrong and offer a compromise.
"A daily dunning," is how Campbell described it.
UNCERTAIN FOOTING
From the start, Obama officials were receptive to calls for change, Campbell and others said. But they seemed uncertain about how to proceed, and the talks had little urgency.
People close to the White House said formulating the policy on contraceptive coverage had been a bruising fight, lasting for months last fall and into the winter, with deep divisions among senior staff - including its Catholics - about the wisdom of requiring Catholic colleges and hospitals to subsidize free birth control for their employees in the name of improving women's health care access.
The administration seemed prepared for a furious protest from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, a formidable adversary in the earlier debate over healthcare reform, people with knowledge of the internal debate said.
But officials appeared taken aback by the intensity of the pleas coming from close Obama allies, several of whom argued to anyone who would listen that the policy was not only morally wrong, but out of step with the president's values.
"This decision just seems not in keeping with the person he is," said Douglas Kmiec, a conservative legal scholar at Pepperdine University and an Obama supporter.
In their quest for a compromise, Kmiec and other allies of the president focused at first on what was dubbed the "Hawaii solution." Hawaii requires all health insurance plans to cover contraception. But it lets religious employers delete that benefit from their plans - so long as they agree to refer any worker seeking contraceptive coverage to a third party that can provide it at nominal cost.
The HAWAII SOLUTION
The Hawaii model excited several Catholic allies, who thought it would neatly solve the problem by ensuring that religious employers didn't have to pay for the birth control benefits themselves.
But as talk about a Hawaii solution intensified, Catholic bishops moved to quash it, arguing that referring women to low-cost contraception would be as immoral as distributing the drugs and devices first-hand.
"The church must have the freedom to refuse to cooperate in any way in making these 'services' available," Bishop William Lori, who heads a committee on religious liberty, wrote on the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops blog. "If we provide the means for another to act against the moral law, we ourselves become morally culpable as well."
That pronouncement came at the crest of a potent protest wave orchestrated by the bishops. Women's groups, meanwhile, had begun pushing back hard against suggestions of compromise.
Judy Waxman, a vice president of the National Women's Law Center, even said she would consider suing if the administration changed the policy in a way that required women to jump through any hoops to get their free contraception. "I see potential litigation in my future," she said before the compromise was reached.
Working frantically behind the scenes, Obama's loose-knit Catholic ally network continued to press its case. As noise on the issue grew, the allies said they began to gain traction with the White House. "As the momentum built, they realized, 'Uh oh, we've got trouble,' " said Campbell, the social-justice advocate.
Yet for days, a solution still seemed elusive. Several possible options would have required legislative approval, and given the divisions in Congress and heated election-year politics, Obama did not want to take that route, those familiar with the process said.
At the same time, said a senior Obama advisor, the president made clear he would not back down from his central point - that women employed by Catholic institutions should have the same right to free birth control, with no deductible and no co-pay, as woman employed by any other entity.
"It was hard figuring out the details of how this could work structurally," said John Gehring, who coordinates Catholic outreach for the group Faith in Public Life, a policy advocacy group generally aligned with Democratic policies.
As they struggled to find a solution, the would-be reformers found considerable support within the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnership, where several staff members suggested they were not happy with the president's original policy. A key point person there: Joshua DuBois, the office head, who knew many of Obama's outside allies from the 2008 campaign and who reports to close Obama confidant Valerie Jarrett.
The faith office "was pressing very hard for a reasonable tweaking of the policy," Gehring said.
Those pushing for compromise also found a friend in Vice President Joe Biden, a fellow Catholic, who had argued from the beginning that religious employers should be exempt from the contraception mandate.
"He understands the Catholic community's views on these issues and is willing to speak up for them when appropriate," said James Salt, executive director of Catholics United, a group with a history of supporting liberal causes.
But though they were getting high-placed signals that a compromise could be worked out, no details emerged. As the days wore on and the political rhetoric grew louder, some Obama allies got discouraged. "The lines in the sand are being drawn sharper and deeper, so I'm not optimistic," Schneck, the political scientist, said earlier this week.
On Friday, Schneck said he realized why he had received so little concrete information about the working compromise. The administration had been so divided in its deliberations about the rule, he said, that "they needed to work this out inside their own walls first," before floating it to key interest groups.
"This was an internecine struggle," he said.
A senior U.S. official said that many of the reports about the internal White House deliberations have been "overdramatized." Officials declined to comment further on internal discussions.
Late Thursday evening, administration officials reached out to Schneck and other involved parties to let them know an announcement was imminent. "There was a tremendous sense of relief," Gehring said.
Before unveiling his compromise Friday morning, Obama called Archbishop Timothy Dolan, president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops; Cecile Richards, president of Planned Parenthood Federation of America; and Sister Carol Keehan, president of the Catholic Health Association of the United States.
Richards and Keehan welcomed the announcement. The Conference of Catholic Bishops has been more cautious, releasing a statement calling the new approach promising, but declining to endorse it fully.
The compromise allows religious employers to opt out of providing birth control coverage to employees. But in making that concession, Obama promised those employees that they could get free contraception all the same, courtesy of their health insurance providers.
Obama's Catholic allies said that approach hit all the right notes. "Very practical, very respectful, very common sense," Roemer said.
Sister Campbell wasn't so restrained: "This," she said, "is a glorious day."